VonMudra
Well-known member
So as some of you know, I write a lot of papers. Being a history major, that's basically my life in college, moving from one paper to the next. I figure I might as well post some of the more interesting ones on here, for anyone who is interested in history writings. I'll post one or two at a time, most are rather long. I guess I'll start with the paper I submitted for my application to the team(at least, if I recall correct, it was this one, might have been another I xD):
[FONT="]The Effect of Propaganda on the Tactical Capability of the British Expeditionary Force, 1900-1918[/FONT]
[FONT="]The outbreak of World War 1 started the first major war on the European Continent since the times of Napoleon. It was marked with incredible advances in weaponry, tactics, and carnage on scales previously thought unimaginable. However, there was a new technology that had been little used before the war, which truly came into its own: propaganda. While usually believed to have had minor effect on the course of what is thought of as a completely static frontline (in which little was gained or lost) a revolution in historical thinking and research has broken new ground on the history of World War 1. The effect that the propaganda on the part of the Allies had on their conduct of the war, and their general tactical inferiority to their German opposition played a pivotal role in the military tactics. The British War Ministry and General Staff were implicit in this propaganda in which, in the words of Minister of War and Prime Minister Lloyd George: “Victories were much overstated. Virtual defeats were represented as victories, however limited their scope. Our casualties were understated. Enemy losses became pyramidal. That was the way the military authorities presented the situation to the Ministers – that was their active propaganda in the Press.”[FONT="][/FONT] As Lloyd George so plainly lays out in word, the British General Staff, and war ministry, were actively involved in lying to the public at large, using the small, little moving front to their advantage, being able to easily cut off and censor any facts coming out from the trenches. In the end however, propaganda meant to keep the public and the government placated, would eventually backfire, as they began to fall into the classic trap of “belief in one’s own lies.” Defeats that became victories soon were considered actual victories. Enemy losses went from conjecture to indisputable fact. And as the generals continued to drift from the reality of the war, their men were thrown into combat under very different terms, and with little knowledge of the truth. The British Expeditionary Force’s (hereafter referred to as the BEF) fate was sealed from the moment the first censorship began in August 1914.[/FONT]
[FONT="] Prior to the outbreak of World War 1, the British Army was probably the most active, and combat experienced army on the European Continent. Involved in almost constant warfare in Africa and India against native tribes and empire, the British had used the wars as testing grounds for various new tactics and weapons, notably machine guns and bolt action rifles. Against the usually poorly equipped and trained native tribes, the British, with few setbacks, tended to butcher the populations, and subject them to British rule with ease. These victories installed a sense of the invincibility of the British Empire and her army, which, in reality, had little basis in fact. It had been 50 years since Britain had fought a ground war against a trained European army, the Russian, and while it had defeated the Russians in the Crimean war, it had done so at incredible loss and with vast amounts of aid in the form of manpower from its French, Turkish, and Sardinian allies. However, despite all common sense, the British continued a sense of superiority at arms over the rest of Europe; confident that its victories in Africa and elsewhere would be just as easy to replicate against the armies of Europe, namely, the German and Austrian militaries. However, one war quickly showed what would happen if the British continued on this route. The Boer War, fought in the 1890s by the British military in South Africa against the Afrikaners, descendents of the original Dutch colonialists, exposed searing fault lines in British tactical doctrine. Despite British numerical superiority, the Boers would inflict defeat after defeat on the British troops, who attempted to fight in the neat lines of the days of the muzzle loading rifle, and in their red jackets, designed for the parade grounds of Canterbury, not the summer sun of Africa. The British took their time to finally adapt to the changing conditions of combat, giving up the neat line formations and red wool jackets for skirmish lines and khaki cotton uniforms, thereby trading pride for combat effectiveness. While ending in British victory, the Boer War would be a glimmer of insight into what would soon take place in Europe, and showed the slow speed at which the British army could deal with change.[/FONT]
[FONT="] This aura of invincibility would become incredibly critical to pre-war British strategic thought. In a war between France and Germany, it was assumed that the BEF, the force delegated to be sent to the continent, and made up of many of Britain’s most elite units, would be the deciding factor. It was felt that the small, but highly trained and motivated group would be the strike force the allies needed to crush any German offensive and turn it back into Germany, taking the war to the German people. However, these arguments were faulty. The British high command had once again failed to catch up to the times since the Boer war. Smokeless powder had become common place, and the advent of the long-recoil mechanism by the French had turned artillery from a supporting weapon to the main killer in warfare, as had been proven in the two Balkan wars.[FONT="][ii][/FONT] As super-heavy artillery had now become a possibility, forts which had originally been constructed to resist bombardment by light artillery or howitzers were now obsolete. The Belgian forts in Liege and Namur were now sitting ducks for the German artillery, which would stand back, out of range, and hammer them into submission.[FONT="][iii][/FONT] However, this was another development that the British had patently missed. Instead of developing the howitzers and super heavy artillery that would be required in modern combat like the Germans had, the British continued to believe that their artillery would simply be a support for maneuvering infantry formations, and duly developed weapons accordingly. The British 18lber was designed as a field gun, with almost no capability for high angle fire, and armed almost completely with shrapnel shells, perfect for the field maneuvers of the late 1800s, but useless for the coming trench warfare.[FONT="][iv][/FONT] The British, operating in their mythology of invincibility, still had no excuse, as trench combat had been a part of warfare since the Crimean and US Civil War, and had come into its own during the Russo-Japanese War, and the Balkan Wars. Instead, the British army with its idea of superiority, simply ignored these events, and put their faith in the old ideas and tactics, with predictable results. When German infantry were streaming through the silent Belgian forts, and their artillery was wreaking havoc on British soldiers from across the horizon, the British simply were at a loss to explain what was going on, much less counter the devastating effects.[FONT="][v][/FONT] It was this characteristic of the British military that led to the rise of propaganda tactics later in WW1.[/FONT]
[FONT="]The outbreak of World War 1 started the first major war on the European Continent since the times of Napoleon. It was marked with incredible advances in weaponry, tactics, and carnage on scales previously thought unimaginable. However, there was a new technology that had been little used before the war, which truly came into its own: propaganda. While usually believed to have had minor effect on the course of what is thought of as a completely static frontline (in which little was gained or lost) a revolution in historical thinking and research has broken new ground on the history of World War 1. The effect that the propaganda on the part of the Allies had on their conduct of the war, and their general tactical inferiority to their German opposition played a pivotal role in the military tactics. The British War Ministry and General Staff were implicit in this propaganda in which, in the words of Minister of War and Prime Minister Lloyd George: “Victories were much overstated. Virtual defeats were represented as victories, however limited their scope. Our casualties were understated. Enemy losses became pyramidal. That was the way the military authorities presented the situation to the Ministers – that was their active propaganda in the Press.”[FONT="][/FONT] As Lloyd George so plainly lays out in word, the British General Staff, and war ministry, were actively involved in lying to the public at large, using the small, little moving front to their advantage, being able to easily cut off and censor any facts coming out from the trenches. In the end however, propaganda meant to keep the public and the government placated, would eventually backfire, as they began to fall into the classic trap of “belief in one’s own lies.” Defeats that became victories soon were considered actual victories. Enemy losses went from conjecture to indisputable fact. And as the generals continued to drift from the reality of the war, their men were thrown into combat under very different terms, and with little knowledge of the truth. The British Expeditionary Force’s (hereafter referred to as the BEF) fate was sealed from the moment the first censorship began in August 1914.[/FONT]
[FONT="] Prior to the outbreak of World War 1, the British Army was probably the most active, and combat experienced army on the European Continent. Involved in almost constant warfare in Africa and India against native tribes and empire, the British had used the wars as testing grounds for various new tactics and weapons, notably machine guns and bolt action rifles. Against the usually poorly equipped and trained native tribes, the British, with few setbacks, tended to butcher the populations, and subject them to British rule with ease. These victories installed a sense of the invincibility of the British Empire and her army, which, in reality, had little basis in fact. It had been 50 years since Britain had fought a ground war against a trained European army, the Russian, and while it had defeated the Russians in the Crimean war, it had done so at incredible loss and with vast amounts of aid in the form of manpower from its French, Turkish, and Sardinian allies. However, despite all common sense, the British continued a sense of superiority at arms over the rest of Europe; confident that its victories in Africa and elsewhere would be just as easy to replicate against the armies of Europe, namely, the German and Austrian militaries. However, one war quickly showed what would happen if the British continued on this route. The Boer War, fought in the 1890s by the British military in South Africa against the Afrikaners, descendents of the original Dutch colonialists, exposed searing fault lines in British tactical doctrine. Despite British numerical superiority, the Boers would inflict defeat after defeat on the British troops, who attempted to fight in the neat lines of the days of the muzzle loading rifle, and in their red jackets, designed for the parade grounds of Canterbury, not the summer sun of Africa. The British took their time to finally adapt to the changing conditions of combat, giving up the neat line formations and red wool jackets for skirmish lines and khaki cotton uniforms, thereby trading pride for combat effectiveness. While ending in British victory, the Boer War would be a glimmer of insight into what would soon take place in Europe, and showed the slow speed at which the British army could deal with change.[/FONT]
[FONT="] This aura of invincibility would become incredibly critical to pre-war British strategic thought. In a war between France and Germany, it was assumed that the BEF, the force delegated to be sent to the continent, and made up of many of Britain’s most elite units, would be the deciding factor. It was felt that the small, but highly trained and motivated group would be the strike force the allies needed to crush any German offensive and turn it back into Germany, taking the war to the German people. However, these arguments were faulty. The British high command had once again failed to catch up to the times since the Boer war. Smokeless powder had become common place, and the advent of the long-recoil mechanism by the French had turned artillery from a supporting weapon to the main killer in warfare, as had been proven in the two Balkan wars.[FONT="][ii][/FONT] As super-heavy artillery had now become a possibility, forts which had originally been constructed to resist bombardment by light artillery or howitzers were now obsolete. The Belgian forts in Liege and Namur were now sitting ducks for the German artillery, which would stand back, out of range, and hammer them into submission.[FONT="][iii][/FONT] However, this was another development that the British had patently missed. Instead of developing the howitzers and super heavy artillery that would be required in modern combat like the Germans had, the British continued to believe that their artillery would simply be a support for maneuvering infantry formations, and duly developed weapons accordingly. The British 18lber was designed as a field gun, with almost no capability for high angle fire, and armed almost completely with shrapnel shells, perfect for the field maneuvers of the late 1800s, but useless for the coming trench warfare.[FONT="][iv][/FONT] The British, operating in their mythology of invincibility, still had no excuse, as trench combat had been a part of warfare since the Crimean and US Civil War, and had come into its own during the Russo-Japanese War, and the Balkan Wars. Instead, the British army with its idea of superiority, simply ignored these events, and put their faith in the old ideas and tactics, with predictable results. When German infantry were streaming through the silent Belgian forts, and their artillery was wreaking havoc on British soldiers from across the horizon, the British simply were at a loss to explain what was going on, much less counter the devastating effects.[FONT="][v][/FONT] It was this characteristic of the British military that led to the rise of propaganda tactics later in WW1.[/FONT]
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